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ABSTRACT:
It is not usually morally permissible to desire the suffering of another person, or to act so as to satisfy this desire; that is, 
to act with the aim of bringing about suffering. If the retributive emotions, and the retributive responses of which they 
are a part, morally permitted or even required, we will need to see what is distinctive about them. One line of argument 
in this paper is for the conclusion that a retributive desire for the suffering of the wrong-doer, and the aim to bring this 
about, can (contra recent arguments from Hanna (2008)) be morally justified.
It has been suggested that by reflecting on the role of the retributive emotions in interpersonal relationships, and the 
alleged legitimacy of the aim for the suffering of the wrong-doer within them, support can be garnered for retributive 
practices of punishment by the state (Duff (1986, 2001), Bennett (2002, 2003)). The conclusion of the second line of 
argument in the paper is that whilst the retributive responses can permissibly aim at suffering, the way in which this is 
so in interpersonal relationships cannot provide support for retributive state punishment.
Responses to wrong-doing, along with resentment, anger, and moral hatred, may include a desire 
for the suffering of the wrong-doer.1 Whether such a desire can be justified is one topic of this 
paper;  another is  whether  the role such a desire plays  in interpersonal  responses to  wrong can 
provide any support for retributive punishment by the state.
Why focus on this aspect of the retributive emotions? First, it is not usually morally permissible to 
desire  the suffering of another person,  or to  act  so as to satisfy this  desire.  Nonetheless,  some 
retributivists have recently argued that in interpersonal relationships, the suffering of the wrong-
doer is appropriate in response to wrongdoing, and that it is permissible - perhaps even required - to 
try to bring such suffering about.  I  will  argue in support of a particular understanding of these 
claims (sections 1-3). This first part of my argument responds to a recent claim (from Hanna 2009) 
about the legitimate aims of the retributive responses.
Second, it has been suggested that the role of the retributive emotions in interpersonal relations 
provides support for retributive practices of punishment by the state (see Duff, 1986, 2001; Bennett, 
2002, 2003). For example, Duff writes that ‘blame, like punishment, is intended to induce suffering 
in  an alleged offender for an alleged offence’,  and goes on to remark,  with regard to criminal 
punishment, that ‘an essential part of its meaning and justification lies in its relation to moral blame’ 
(1986, p.41). I will argue against this strategy: neither the suffering of guilt, nor the suffering of 
repentance, as they feature in the 'retributivism of interpersonal relations' can provide support for 
the imposition of  suffering of  punishment  (sections 3-4).   This  part  of the argument  calls  into 
question  a  methodology  prominent  in  contemporary  literature;  namely,  to  draw  support  from 
interpersonal  analogues  for  state  practices  of  punishment  (see  Bennett  2002,  2003;  Duff  1986, 
2001; Tasioulas 2006).
1 See Strawson 1974; Bennett, 2002, 2003; Mason 2003; and Murphy & Hampton 1990.
1. Retributive responses and aiming at suffering
Imagine that you arrive home to find the lock broken, the door hanging, your belongings ransacked: 
a burglary. You feel a range of emotions: anger at the loss; indignation  at the disrespect manifested 
in the break in; resentment towards whomever it was that disregarded your interests, and the kinds 
of inconveniences the damage and losses will now cause you. Perhaps you also feel also dismay 
that such considerations were paid little heed. You might also want to see the wrong-doer suffer – to 
feel bad about the wrong; or to pay for what he or she has done. 
Is the desire for suffering a necessary component of the retributive emotions? Strawson (1974) 
remarks on:
'the partial withdrawal of goodwill which these attitudes  entail, [and] the modification 
they  entail of the general demand that another should, if possible, be spared suffering' 
(1974, p.23, emphasis added, original emphasis removed).
The reactive attitudes of anger and resentment entail a withdrawal from the usual unwillingness to 
impose (or see) suffering. Further:
'the  readiness  to  acquiesce  in  the  infliction  of  suffering  on the  offender  which  is  an 
essential part of punishment is all of a piece with this whole range of reactive attitudes' 
(p.23, emphasis added)
On this characterisation the desire for the suffering of the wrong-doer (the readiness to acquiesce in 
its infliction) is a part of the usual range of the reactive attitudes of resentment and anger. Strawson 
casts such a desire as a common component of the reactive attitudes, along with resentment and 
anger.
One might maintain that far from being necessary, such desires have no proper place in the reactive 
attitudes to wrong-doing. Darwall for example, maintains that 'reactive attitudes like resentment and 
indignation can be distinguished from the desire to retaliate or gain vengeance' (2006, p.83). On his 
view, a vengeful wish for suffering responds to disrespect with disrespect; though resentment and 
indignation presuppose respect for the moral authority of the person blamed or resented (p.84).
Darwall’s suggestion presents an appealing ideal.2 However, I take Strawson's claim as reasonably 
uncontroversial: the desire for the wrong-doer's suffering is at least sometimes - perhaps frequently 
-  a  feature of human responses to wrongs.  The question is  whether,  when it  is  present,  such a 
component of the retributive responses can be justified. Are such desires rightly understood as a 
form  of  disrespectful  vengeance?  Do  some  desires  for  suffering  have  a  proper  place  in  the 
emotional responses to wrongdoing?
I will  argue that,  on a suitably narrow understanding,  such desires can be justified.  As such,  I 
continue to refer to such responses as 'the retributive emotions',  but it  should be noted that the 
retributive element I argue is warranted is narrower than that for which others have argued. 
1.1 Retributive hatred and the exclusivity requirement
In  the  face  of  concerns  that  the  retributive  responses  are  'vindictive,  inhumane,  barbarous  and 
immoral'3 theorists have tried to rationalise responses, such as retributive hatred, arguing that it can 
be morally permissible, and perhaps even required, to desire the suffering of someone who has 
wronged you. Such responses, it is argued, are in the service of some value; they are not base and 
brutish. Consider Murphy's remarks:
2 For discussion of empirical work that may provide support for Darwall’s picture as an ideal, see Holroyd 2007.
3 Mabbott, quoted in Armstrong, 1961, p.471. See also Bennett 2002 p.148.
‘Jones has injured me, has taken unfair  advantage of me, has brought me low, and is 
himself unrepentant and flourishing. I hate him and want him brought low. […] I want 
Jones to be hurt. [...] [P]art of the basis for desiring the hurt is the desire to restore what 
seems (at least to me) to be the proper moral balance of whatever goods are in question’ 
(1990, p.89)4
Such hatred, and the wish to see another suffer, he claims, is neither irrational nor immoral (p.90); 
rather, it is the appropriate response and serves to maintain one's self-respect: 'resentment, (in its 
range from righteous anger and righteous hatred) functions primarily in defence of ... certain values  
of the self. [...] [T]he primary value defended by the passion of resentment is self-respect' (p.16). To 
recognise that one has been wronged, undeservedly so, requires a response: self-respect requires 
that one feel resentment when wronged, and seek retribution and reparation for that wrong. To fail 
to do so is to allow oneself to be slighted, to be a 'doormat'. 
Murphy  suggests  that  various  considerations  might  ultimately  counsel  against  acting  on  such 
desires,5 but  he nonetheless maintains  that  they are  'natural,  fitting and proper  [in]  response to 
certain instances of wrongdoing' (p.108). In virtue of what is the response 'proper'? Whilst it seems 
quite right that self-respect requires some response, there is an argumentative gap between the claim 
that self-respect requires that wrongs do not go unchallenged and the claim that self-respect requires 
that one ought to desire (and perhaps bring it about) that the wrong-doer suffer.6 Other responses 
that preserve self-respect might yet be available – for example, one might desire that the offender 
recognise that he has wronged you, or that the community publicly reaffirm your rights.
Hampton, for example, offers an alternative which does not make suffering a necessary part of the 
retributive response:
'punishment is not so much the infliction of pain as it is the infliction of a defeat that 
annuls the wrongdoer's claim of superiority, which such non-painful experiences as 
community  service  can  deliver,  just  as  well  as  pain  (although  because  pain  is 
commonly seen to represent defeat, it is a useful medium to symbolise the idea that 
the wrongdoer is not one's superior)' (1990, p.143)
Although Hampton is similarly concerned with the assertion of one's moral status in response to 
wrongs which attempt to degrade it, she envisages responses that affirm self-respect and are non-
painful.7 Pain  might  be  a  useful  symbol,  but  alternatives  are  available.  Reflecting  on  this 
argumentative gap indicates what I want to draw out as a moral constraint on our responses to 
wrongdoing; namely that where such responses are guided by some purpose, the method of securing 
that purpose which involves the least suffering should be preferred.  More precisely:
4  Murphy 1990.
5 To wit: we might not be in an epistemic position to know that our hatred is warranted; it may be costly or impossible 
to get even; we may be in no position to make such judgements; or may find that moral decency counsels against 
acting on retributive desires.
6 Murphy does try to fill this gap. In brief, relying on a principle according to which it is morally permissible to desire 
to do (under the same description) what it is morally permissible to do, he maintains that it is morally permissible to 
punish (that is, to impose such suffering); and therefore, it is morally permissible to desire to do so (p.94). 
First, I doubt the principle is generally true. Certain 'lifeboat ethics' actions, (such as that of 'saving the five at cost of 
letting one die') or the imposition of certain risks (e.g. risks to life imposed by cyclists) may be morally permissible. 
But to desire to do such things appears morally problematic. Such an actions are, if morally permissible, regrettable. 
Desiring to so act would be morally problematic. Second,  Murphy's  argument  relies  on  the  assumption  that 
punishment is permissible, and I am not yet willing to grant this. Finally, Murphy himself concedes that there may 
be a number of reasons for overcoming the responses of retributive hatred (see fn.6).
7 One might wonder whether options such as community service do not involve suffering (see Duff 2001, pp.99-104). 
See section 4.
Exclusivity: if it is permissible to do A, which imposes suffering for purpose P (e.g. 
affirming  self-respect,  expressing  censure,  communicating  disapproval  and  making 
reparation8), this is because no (feasible) alternative way of securing P which imposes 
less suffering is available.
This seems to be a plausible and morally respectable general principle, and one which can guide 
thinking  about  the  retributive  responses.  Those  retributivists  who  claim that  the  imposition  of 
suffering is necessary for some further purpose will need to show why imposing suffering (to that 
extent) is the uniquely appropriate way of securing or protecting this further goal or value (either 
that it is instrumentally superior, or that it is a constitutive part of that goal). In particular, these 
retributivists  must  show  the  inadequacy  of  alternative  responses  to  wrongdoing  (such  as 
Hampton’s)  which do not  require  that  suffering is  imposed.  Thus the burden is  the heavy and 
ongoing one of arguing for the superiority of imposing suffering over other responses which do not 
require this.
On some versions of retributivism the imposition of suffering in response to  wrongdoing is  an 
intrinsic good.9 Such views will not be susceptible to the concern that the valued purpose can be 
secured by means which do not involve (or at least minimise) suffering; for proponents of such a 
view hold that the suffering in itself is the valuable aim. My argument will not speak directly to 
such views. That much of the recent literature attempts to move away from such views, indicates, in 
my view, their implausibility. I hope that by showing the difficulty of justifying the imposition of 
suffering even for the sake of some plausible aim (censure or affirmation of self-respect, say), the 
difficulty of arguing that it is intrinsically valuable becomes clearer.10
2. Expressions of disapproval and the exclusivity requirement
Recent explorations of the retributive responses provide a clear view on the ways (if any) that the 
retributive responses might legitimately have the suffering of the wrong-doer as an aim. Bennett has 
prised  apart  the  painful  elements  of  the  interactions  that  follow  wrong-doing  in  interpersonal 
relationships: the expression of disapproval, the acceptance of blame, and the burdens of repentance 
and reparation. These aspects are painful for the wrong-doer, but engaging in them is not a matter of 
mere retributive hatred;  they are constructive parts of calling the wrong-doer to account for her 
action.11 I  deal  here with the first  aspect  of retributive suffering – expression of  disapproval  – 
turning to the latter two in following sections.
We have not seen that it is appropriate to desire or aim to impose suffering upon the wrong-doer, 
when  wronged.  But  it  is  surely  plausible  that  it  is  permissible,  and  even  required,  to  express 
disapproval in response to wrongs. To not do so really would fail to adequately address the wrong, 
and perhaps fail to manifest the appropriate self-respect. Recall the example of the burglary, above: 
encountering the burglar (later), it would be quite proper - and certainly morally permissible - to 
call her to account ('Why did you do it?', 'Didn't you think of the upset it would cause?') and to 
express disapproval.
But  expressing  disapproval,  Bennett  argues,  itself  involves  imposing  suffering.  It  involves 
behaviours  (by  the  wronged  or  perhaps  some  third  party)  which  are  typically  painful  for  the 
recipient: withdrawal from a relationship, is Bennett’s paradigm case. By refraining from speaking 
to the wrong-doer, or 'giving them the cold shoulder', we convey disapproval and impose unpleasant 
8 See Murphy 1990; Tasioulas 2006; Duff 2001 respectively.
9 E.g.: 'there is some intrinsic value in the suffering of the guilty'  (Davis, 1972, p.136.); this is 'seen as right or good 
in itself, apart from the further consequences to which it might lead' (Nozick, 1981, p.374)
10 Such views face difficulties in explaining why suffering other than that imposed by the state (e.g. suffering which 
precedes conviction) is not relevant to how much punishment is deserved. See Metz 2000, pp.506-507.
11 See also Duff 1986, p.42-52; 2001, pp.107-112.
treatment  upon her.  Similarly,  Duff  writes  of  'the  pain  which  I  suffer  merely from the  hostile 
reactions of others' (1986, p.59). These reactions are painful to experience.12 But such treatment is 
not simply retributive hatred; its aim is not to 'bring the offender low'; rather such treatment is an 
expression of moral disapproval which attempts to bring it about that the offender recognises the 
wrong done: such withdrawal is expressive and purposive (Bennett 2002, p.152).
Is it justifiable to impose such suffering? This will depend upon whether suffering is a necessary 
part of the communication of disapproval. If so, then, insofar as it is justifiable to communicate 
disapproval, imposing suffering as part of that communication can be justified. If the retributive 
emotions are  comprised of a desire for  this kind of suffering -  suffering due to the unpleasant 
expressions  of  disapproval  -  then  such  a  desire  may be  justified.  But  if  such  suffering  is  not 
necessary to the communication, then the exclusivity condition will not be met: an alternative way 
of communicating without imposing (as much) suffering is morally preferable. 
2.1 Withdrawal as a necessary means of expression?
There are two reasons to suppose that Bennett does not pick out a necessary component of the 
retributive response. First, there is reason to doubt that withdrawal is necessary for the expression of 
disapproval. Second, alternative means by which disapproval may be expressed need not be painful 
for the wrong-doer. I deal with these issues in turn.
Bennett  uses  an  example  different  from mine;  he  focuses  on  relationships  already established 
(between colleagues), from which some parties,  in response to the wrong, withdraw.13 Thus, he 
claims 'retribution  requires the suffering that is imposed on the wrongdoer by the withdrawal of 
other members of the community' (2002, p.152 (my emphasis)). Is withdrawal the only, or even 
best, way to communicate disapproval?
My example (of the burglar) suggests that claims about the role of withdrawal in retribution are 
limited. For my example provides a case in which (we have supposed) no pre-existing relationship 
obtains, and thus there is not withdrawal, as such, from the relationship. Rather the relationship is 
established by the wrong, and by the responses to it. It cannot be right that withdrawal is required in 
all  cases  for  the  communication  of  disapproval.  Bennett's  claims,  if  they  are  true  of  some 
relationships, cannot be extended to responses to wrongdoing by strangers. This leaves open the 
possibility that means other than withdrawal are available to communicate disapproval.
Might one insist that nonetheless there is a kind of withdrawal in my example? We could say that 
one ceases to have the dispositions one might otherwise have towards the offender; you are no 
longer  well-disposed  towards  her,  as  you  are  to  others  -  there  is  no  longer  a  presumption  of 
goodwill between you. Withdrawal from  this stance, if not from pre-established relationships, is 
painful for the offender. But casting the withdrawal claim in this way seems forced: first, because 
the absence of prior interaction between the two parties; second, because the wrong committed has 
already  broken  that  presumption;  and  third,  because  given  the  sparseness  of  our  existing 
relationship, there is a limit to how much I can withdraw without failing in my basic duties. I resent 
the wrong-doer, but I would not (and ought not) fail to react if it were she drowning in the nearby 
pond.
If painful withdrawal from relationships is not an essential component of the retributive responses, 
what  alternative  modes  of  conveying  disapproval  are  there?  Must  conveying  disapproval  be 
12 Morris (1971) also refers to 'the pain that comes from separating ourselves from the union that we value' (p.426), i.e. 
from the relationships before the wrong. This metaphor is a little opaque, so I focus on Bennett's claims - although 
my concerns (in 2.1) apply to this aspect of Morris' claims also.
13 One might argue that it is only appropriate to focus on such close relationships in considering interpersonal 
responses to wrong; but this seems to be a mistake. Many wrongs happen between individuals who do not know 
each other well (if at all), and the reactive attitudes are a feature of these 'minimally' interpersonal relationships.
painful? Or can one communicate blame and disapproval whilst neither wanting, nor aiming for, the 
infliction of suffering?
Consider Hanna's critique of Bennett's view. He asks: 
“must we aim to harm someone or make him suffer when we express disapproval? No. 
Certainly we can express disapproval in such ways, but we need not. We can tell a third 
party what  we think,  for example.  [...]   We can,  for example,  express disapproval  in 
careful, measured ways and even offer comfort to those we criticize” (2009, p.241)
On Hanna's view aiming to express disapproval does not entail that one aims at the suffering of the 
wrong-doer. Other expressive means - albeit less conventionally familiar ones - could be used to 
convey moral disapproval. So on this view, in accordance with the exclusivity condition, if one aims 
to express disapproval one ought to do so in the way that involves the least suffering. 
2.2 Expressing disapproval and imposing suffering
Hanna's  remarks  here  are  ambiguous.  On one  reading,  Hanna is  asking whether  the  means  of  
expression must aim at suffering; that is, whether the expression of disapproval must use  a means 
of  conveying  disapproval  which  is  intentionally  painful  for  the  recipient.  Withdrawal  from  a 
relationship (imposing psychological harm), or corporal punishments (imposing physical harm) are 
examples of painful modes of expression. This reading is implied by the answer Hanna gives to his 
own question, above. The other reading, which I take up in more detail shortly, concerns whether 
expressing disapproval itself must aim at suffering.
Hanna's claim that the mode of expression of disapproval need not be one which involves suffering 
is plausible. As we have seen, painful withdrawal from relationships is not the uniquely appropriate 
means  of  expressing  disapproval.  Other  ways  of  expressing  this  are  available:  simply  telling 
another,  or  writing  to  them.  In  accordance  with  the  exclusivity  condition,  they  are  morally 
preferable to modes which impose suffering.
But are such alternative modes of expression really adequate to convey disapproval? One might 
argue that such alternatives are in fact not sufficient to communicate moral disapproval in all cases; 
sometimes, harsh treatment is needed to express blame. For example, Tasioulas maintains that to 
properly convey moral condemnation of some serious wrongs, hard treatment is required:
'only punishment adequately conveys the blame the wrong-doer deserves. [...]  Only 
such a response adequately reflects the gravity of the wrong that has been committed. 
[... It] enables us to properly evince the sincerity of our condemnation' (2003, p.296, 
emphasis added). 
Is this right? One can make various utterances to communicate blame, and the meaning of such 
utterances is clear. But the thought here is that a response to some serious wrongs which did not 
impose  suffering  would  be  inadequate  to  show  that  one  really disapproves  or  blames  the 
wrongdoer; it would not be enough to show that one takes the wrong seriously. We can agree that it 
is important to respond in a way that takes the wrong seriously. But must this involve the imposition 
of suffering? Tasioulas remarks that we should see that it is appropriate as 'a basic norm of justice' 
(2006, p.297). But it  is important to consider whether there are other responses that are able to 
convey blame whilst also taking the wrong seriously. Whilst further work is needed to show that 
other such responses could be adequate, I here want to show that Tasioulas' argument for the claim 
that only punishment is adequate is based on a false assumption about the relationship between 
blame and punishment.
Central to his argument is the claim that that only by imposing suffering (e.g. by state punishment) 
can one communicate a condemnation that is keyed to the gravity of the wrong. Tasioulas is able to 
move  from  the  plausible  claim  about  the  appropriateness  of  blame  or  condemnation  to  the 
contentious claim about appropriateness of imposing painful punishment as a means of conveying 
blame by 'rejecting the stark distinction between censure and hard treatment' (2006, p.295). On his 
view, the imposition of punitive suffering is just a 'scaled up' version of the condemnation of blame 
(scaled up in proportion to the seriousness of the wrong). 
However I will shortly argue (in section 3) that it is precisely right that there is a stark distinction 
between  moral  disapproval  and  the  hard  treatment  of  punishment  -  that  they  are  importantly 
different in kind. In particular, expressions of blame ought not impose suffering. So the smooth 
transition from the appropriateness of blame to the appropriateness of imposing punitive suffering 
cannot be made.
State punishment may have some distinct  functions, such as the 'authoritative disavowal'  of the 
wrong (Feinberg 1965): punitive responses may serve to distance the state from the wrong (Metz 
2000, p.497). One might argue that the imposition of suffering is needed to perform this function 
and to convey condemnation to others (this is not usually important in interpersonal relationships, 
and may be inappropriate). To write a letter, or even make a public announcement in condemnation 
of the wrong, would be insufficient to symbolically distance the state from the wrongs.14 Tasioulas's 
remarks about evincing the sincerity of the condemnation may draw on this thought.
Even still, a further argument is needed to show that suffering is the only appropriate way for the 
state to respond adequately to a wrong: there may be alternatives that are non-painful but can still 
demonstrate that one takes the wrong seriously. Indeed, a response which is constructive and likely 
to help the wrong-doer avoid further instances of wrong might do more to demonstrate a sincere 
disavowal  of  the  wrong.15 More  work  is  needed  to  show  the  adequacy  of  such  alternatives. 
Importantly,  any such response will  be coercively imposed.  As I will  argue in section 4 this  is 
another  reason  to  suppose  that  such  practices  cannot  garner  support  from  our  responses  to 
wrongdoing in interpersonal relationships.
To recap the claims of this subsection: Hanna's remarks challenged the thought that the means of  
expressing  disapproval must impose suffering,  and I have argued in support  of Hanna's  claims, 
against those who maintain that only by imposing suffering can adequate blame or disapproval be 
conveyed. Some of this argument, regarding the distinction between expressing blame and imposing 
hard treatment, is still pending. We can now turn to this matter, in considering the other possible 
disambiguation of Hanna's remarks.
Recall the alternative reading of Hanna's claims: must expressing disapproval itself aim at suffering 
–  a  suffering  independent  of  the  means  of  expression  used?  On  this  interpretation,  the  issue 
concerns  whether  expressing  disapproval,  even  by moderate  means  such  as  telling  another,  or 
writing  to  them,  entails  aiming  at  suffering.  Do  we  suppose  that  being  on  the  end  of  moral 
disapproval, no matter how it is communicated, is painful and unpleasant? If we want someone to 
know that we disapprove of them, does this entail that we desire that they undergo some suffering - 
and do the retributive responses thereby aim at suffering in this sense? Hanna’s disambiguation of 
his question did not address this cluster of questions. But they are of central importance, as we shall 
see.
14 In this paper Metz is explicit in assuming, rather than arguing for, the claim that harsh treatment can be justified as 
the means of expressing censure. 
15 An example is the 'Changing Lives Through Literature' programme, which offers mandatory reading groups as an 
alternative sentencing option. See http://cltl.umassd.edu/home-flash.cfm (accessed 12/08/2010).
3. Expressing disapproval and inducing suffering: guilt
In this section, I make three key claims: first, that the kind of suffering that is justified in response 
to wrongdoing is the suffering of guilt;  second, that  it  is  permissible to act  to bring about this 
suffering; third, in so acting it is permissible to act with the aim, or desire, of bringing about this 
kind of suffering. 
I will start with part of the justification for the second claim. We have seen (in section 2) that, 
plausibly,  expressing disapproval in response to wrongdoing is  permissible (and might even be 
required by self-respect). Additional support for this claim is found in the purposive element of 
conveying  disapproval,  to  which  Bennett  (2002)  has  drawn attention.  He maintains  that,  when 
purposive in this way, the retributive emotions do not merely issue in cathartic behaviour:
it would be wrong to understand the expression of the emotion of blame as a mere release 
of pent-up emotion, such as might be taken out on a punch-bag (p.151)
Rather, the aim is to bring about a certain change in the wrong-doer:
The behaviour which expresses blame is, after all, an attempt to bring something about, 
namely, that the offender should recognize that we disapprove of him (p.153).
Not only do we try to communicate the fact  of our disapproval; we aim to bring the 
wrongdoer to share it (p.152)
The aim of expressing disapproval is to bring it about that the wrong-doer recognises that she has 
done wrong, and accept that disapproval is warranted. Thus additional justification for blame is 
grounded  in  the  goal  of  bringing  the  wrong-doer  to  acknowledge  the  blame;  this  may  be  an 
important step in their coming to repudiate such actions.16 Having done so, we expect the wrong-
doer to resolve to refrain from so acting in future;  she might reaffirm the values that  she now 
recognises were violated, and shape her future behaviour accordingly.
But  (moving  now  to  the  first  key  claim)  in  bringing  it  about  that  the  wrong-doer  accepts 
disapproval, or blame, for the wrong, Bennett claims, we also bring it about that the wrong-doer 
experiences a certain kind of suffering, for:
when [s]he comes to see … that [s]he has done wrong … there is the painful feeling of 
guilt. Guilt is a kind of pain you impose on yourself (2002, p.155).
It  is  painful  to  know that  one  is  prone  to  fall  short  of  [moral  standards]  or  more 
seriously, to harm the things one aspires to respect. So feeling guilt follows on in some 
sense (not automatically,  but in terms of a deepening moral understanding) from an 
understanding that one has done wrong (2003, p.134).
The kind of suffering at issue here is the unpleasant pain of guilt. As Herbert Morris puts it:
'reflecting on the ways we have felt when feeling guilty, we may recall thinking that we 
felt rotten, depleted of energy, and tense' (1971, p.246).
This  kind  of  suffering  seems  an  appropriate,  and  indeed  constructive,  part  of  the  retributive 
experience. It is what Duff refers to as ‘the kind of pain which is the proper end of moral blame’ 
(1986, p.59). If this is the kind of suffering at issue, and if it is permissible to act (by expressing 
16 There is a difference between getting the agent to realise that her action was wrong, and getting her to realise it is 
disapproved of. The former is principally at stake here. See Duff 1986, see pp.42-52. 
disapproval or blame) to bring it about, should we also say, then, that the desire or aim to bring 
about this kind of suffering is permissible? 
One might think not: I can act with the recognition that guilt is an appropriate reaction (as the 
'proper end' of blame), without it being permissible to desire that such a reaction comes about. By 
analogy, I might act with the recognition that grief is an appropriate reaction to my imparting the 
news of a death, but whilst I anticipate the recipient will feel grief, surely I ought not wish for, or 
desire that she feel it? Indeed Hanna has recently rejected the claim that aiming at suffering is a 
necessary part of expressing disapproval. He maintains that: 
‘aiming to get offenders to adopt such beliefs [about their  past wrongdoing and the 
appropriateness of blame] need not involve an aim to harm them or make them suffer’ 
(2009, p.245). 
In support of this claim, Hanna argues that there are two ways to understand the claim that to aim 
for  the wrong-doer's  acceptance  of  blame is  to  aim for  their  suffering.  Neither,  he claims,  are 
plausible. Thus even if acting in a way that brings about such suffering is permissible, aiming to 
bring it about may not be. What are the two interpretations at issue?
3.1 Inducing guilt and aiming at suffering
First, the claim could be an identity claim: to have the relevant belief is to suffer. What looks very 
much like an identity claim can be found in Duff’s remarks:
‘I cannot first blame [the wrong-doer] and then decide whether to try to make him 
suffer thus, since to blame him is to try to induce such suffering; he cannot accept my 
blame and hope to avoid such suffering, since to accept blame is to suffer thus’ (1986, 
p.60 emphasis in original)
But this, Hanna claims, is implausible: a belief is not suffering. Moreover, one can imagine counter-
examples  to  the identity thesis:  someone who accepts  that  he did wrong and is  gleeful  at  this 
thought.17
On the second understanding, there is a causal connection between accepting the relevant belief and 
undergoing suffering: ‘these beliefs dispose us to suffer’ (Hanna, 2008, p.249 n.9). Many of us may 
as a matter of empirical fact feel bad in response to accepting blame. But we can certainly think of 
cases where this causal relation does not hold. Even in the cases where the causal relation does 
obtain, Hanna suggests, it does not follow that those expressing disapproval aim at the suffering of 
the wrong-doer, nor that they ought to.18
It seems quite right that neither of these two understandings of the relationship between accepting 
blame and the relevant self-imposed suffering can generate the conclusion that those expressing 
disapproval permissibly aim at suffering. But Hanna has offered us only two options, when there is 
a third.
An alternative option (and the sense in which we should read Duff’s claims above) is that when one 
comes to believe that one has done wrong and accepts blame, one ought then to feel bad. Proper 
acceptance of blame is in part constituted by such feelings of guilt. So the claim about the belief and 
the suffering is neither an identity claim, nor a causal claim, but a normative one. That the suffering 
17 Some may deny that the person who responds in this way really does believe (or judge) that she did wrong: she may 
use moral notions only in the ‘inverted commas’ sense (Hare 1952, pp.124-126).
18 I presume the thought here is: I can aim to win the prize without aiming to make the loser cry, even if I believe it 
will most likely occur as a causal consequence of my winning. And, in the usual course of things, I certainly ought 
not to aim for this.
of guilt is a constitutive part of accepting blame seems to be what Bennett and Duff have in mind in 
their respective comments: that the interaction is 'fundamentally incomplete unless it brings about 
guilt and repentance' (Bennett 2002, p.155); and such ‘pain is integral to a repentant recognition of 
guilt’ (Duff 1986, pp.59).
This third option is the most plausible one. It assumes that affective states are constitutive of certain 
moral attitudes towards one's actions: fully recognising that one has done wrong is constituted by 
the pain of moral guilt.19 The claim is not a causal one: an agent may fail to feel bad, in the way that 
they ought to. But this will indicate a, rational failure, or a failure to properly recognise the wrong 
and accept the moral disapproval.20 If this is right, then aiming to bring about in the wrong-doer 
acceptance of blame cannot be prised apart from aiming to bring it about that she feels the suffering 
of guilt. Hanna is wrong to suppose that accepting blame is simply a matter of forming beliefs: the 
suffering of guilt is constitutive of the proper acceptance of blame. Expressing disapproval with the 
aim of bringing the wrongdoer to share in that disapproval cannot be separated from the aim of 
bringing about the suffering of guilt.
If these arguments are accepted, then we have secured the conclusion that it can be permissible, in 
this way, to desire or aim for the suffering of another. Whilst such a desire is not usually morally 
permissible, consider the various further things that can be said in justificatory support of desiring 
and aiming for the suffering of guilt:  first,  if  this  suffering is  constitutive of the acceptance of 
blame, the exclusivity condition is met. The relevant purposes of the interactions following wrong-
doing (moral repair and reconciliation, via the expression and acceptance of moral disapproval) 
cannot be achieved without this kind of suffering.
Second,  having  this  aim is  not  susceptible  to  the  usual  objection that  a  desire  for  suffering  is 
vindictive and barbaric. The suffering involved here - the suffering of guilt - is a constructive part of 
the response to wrongdoing. Moreover, practices of blaming treat the wrongdoer with respect, as a 
person  capable  of  change.  As  Tasioulas  emphasises,  'implicit  in  the  blaming  response  is  a 
recognition of their moral status as responsible agents beings who ... are able to grasp and comply 
with reasons' (2006, p.294). Finally, if the pain of guilt is constitutive of the proper recognition of 
wrong and acceptance of blame, then considerations of self-respect make it reasonable to seek such 
a response. 
I have argued that following wrong-doing it can be permissible to desire, and act with the aim of 
inducing, the pain of guilt. This suffering is constitutive, and normatively required, of those who 
properly  accept  blame  for  their  wrongdoing,  and  there  are  good  reasons  for  desiring  that  the 
suffering of guilt are felt, and for aiming to bring it about. But can this preliminary conclusion, lend 
any support for the practices of punishment?
3.2 Justifying punishment?
Hanna argued that because responses to wrong-doing need not and should not aim at suffering, they 
do not provide support for punitive institutions. I have argued that our retributive responses can 
permissibly aim for the suffering of the wrong-doer, in a specific sense. Does this help to justify 
retributive punishment by the state? My aim in this subsection is to show that the 'retributivism of 
interpersonal  relationships'  cannot  provide  justificatory support  for  retributive  state  punishment 
19 Compare judgement internalism about moral beliefs, where judging an action morally good or right entails a 
(defeasible) motivational pull. See Brink, 1989 p.40; Darwall, 1983, p.54.
20 One might maintain that we should still hope that suffering is avoided. Might the hope be that agent experiences 
moral or rational shortcomings, such that she does not feel bad as she would otherwise? This strategy is implausible: 
we can hardly call for the failure of moral and rational capacities so as to avoid suffering, if those very capacities 
ought to be engaged when we ask someone to accept blame. Moreover, it is unclear that reconciliatory processes 
could be achieved in the absence of such guilt: part of the process of accepting disapproval and undertaking to 
reform requires that one feel bad in the appropriate way. 
(hereafter, simply 'punishment').
According to retributivists, punishment ought to aim at suffering, either for its own sake (on the 
'intrinsic good' versions of retributivism); or for the sake of some further purpose (instrumentally, or 
as constitutive of), for example, the expression of censure, or the communication of disapproval. 
For these ends, it is held that the appropriate (and sometimes only adequate) response to criminal 
activity is to impose some painful experience upon the wrong-doer. Of the various justifications for 
such views, I am concerned here solely with whether interpersonal practices of blaming can support 
retributive state punishment.
In the first two sections, I argued that in interpersonal relations it is difficult to justify aiming at 
imposing suffering. Insofar as disapproval or condemnation can be expressed without the means of 
expression being painful, to aim at imposing suffering cannot be morally permissible. I then argued 
that it is permissible to aim to induce a certain kind of suffering, namely, guilt.
The first thing to note is that the kind of suffering that it is permissible to aim at in interpersonal 
relationships21 and the manner in which it is brought about, is contra Tasioulas (see subsection 2.2), 
quite different from the kind of suffering aimed at in punishment. Morris makes this clear:
'the pain we suffer when feeling guilty differs from the pain that is inflicted with the 
significance for us of punishment' (1971, p.129)
And this much is recognised by Duff, in his acknowledgement that whilst the proper purpose of 
blame is:
‘to induce the kind of pain which flows from an understanding of the condemnation … 
matters are surely quite different when punishment takes the form of hard treatment: for 
the suffering which such punishments most obviously and directly cause is independent 
of their communicative meaning’ (1986, p.242). 
Any painful guilt felt due to recognition of wrong-doing and acceptance of blame is supplemented, 
in  punishment,  with  other  forms  of  suffering.  In  punishment,  the  forms  of  treatment  imposed 
(incarceration,  fines) are  intended to  be unpleasant  –  they are  supposed to  be burdensome and 
unpleasant to undergo.22 Any aim to impose suffering cannot garner support from the reflections on 
blaming in interpersonal relationships. For we saw that it is permissible to desire and act so as to 
induce  suffering  of  a  particular  kind:  guilt.  Not  only  is  guilt  a  qualitatively  different  kind  of 
suffering to that of punishment, it is a form of suffering that is induced, and flows from the wrong-
doers own understanding of her action, rather than being imposed by another. 
Perhaps, then, punitive practices find support insofar as they aim to induce in offenders guilt? But it 
is  not  clear  that  retributivists  envisage  guilt  as  any  thing  more  than  a  desirable  side-effect  of 
punishment. Nor should they,  without significant argument to show that bringing about specific 
affective states (namely, guilt) in its citizens is the legitimate business of the state, and is consistent 
with respect for values such as autonomy and privacy.
Moreover, if we are primarily concerned with attempts to induce guilt in the wrong-doer, there is 
evidence to suggest that imposing suffering is not likely to be an effective way of doing so. In brief, 
social psychologists’ findings indicate that individuals tend to react oppositionally to judgemental 
pressures and attempts at controlling behaviour. An agent who experiences this kind of 'reactance' 
21  I mean relationships between people (close friends and strangers) rather than between citizen and state.
22  I return to the matter of treatments that are not intrinsically burdensome, but which are coercively imposed, in the 
next section.
will  then be less likely to take on board the message of the judgement,  and more likely to be 
defensive of her action and the values that informed it (Springer 2008, p.410-412). On the basis of 
this  evidence  we would  expect  the  imposition  of  suffering  qua  punishment  (an  acute  form of 
judgemental pressure, and an obvious attempt to control behaviour) to be a singularly bad way of 
bringing about the acceptance of blame, and the suffering of guilt.
The suffering permissibly aimed for in practices of blaming provides no support for, and perhaps 
provides some considerations that speak against, imposition of punishment in response to wrongs. 
To be clear: I have not argued that such suffering (or the aim to bring it about) cannot be justified, 
but  rather  that  any  justificatory  support  cannot  be  garnered  from reflection  on  the  retributive 
emotions as they feature in our practices of blaming.
4. Repentance, conditionality and coercion
I will briefly consider a further kind of suffering identified as important to interpersonal retributive 
responses:  that  involved  in  repentance.  Showing  repentance  might  require  making  amends,  by 
undertaking burdensome steps which express regret. Repentant acts may be part of an attempt to 
repair the relationship damaged by the wrong:
A repentant wrong-doer might also punish himself … [and] undertake and undergo a 
penance as a punishment, not simply because [he] deserves to suffer for it, but to assist 
and express [his] repentant understanding of what [he] has done (Duff, 986, pp.68-69).
Bennett too suggests that: 
[A wrong-doer] might be expected to do something more, something which involves 
some extra sacrifice to himself (2002, p.160. See also 2003, pp.134-136).
Might this further kind of suffering provide some support for retributive state punishment? Consider 
first  the  characteristics  of  the  suffering  of  repentance.  It  is  undertaken in  an  attempt  to  repair 
damaged relationships. Such 'penances' need not be intrinsically unpleasant, but the undertaking of 
tasks in penance can itself be painful, expressing moral humility, one's acceptance of blame, and 
willingness to put things right. One important aspect of these sacrifices is that they are self-imposed 
and willingly undertaken: the burdens are part of a voluntary undertaking which has symbolic value: 
‘The  willingness to undergo these forms of suffering is a sign of sincere repentance’ 
(Bennett, 2002, p.161, my emphasis).
Likewise, Duff is clear that the suffering of repentance is not necessary, but can be voluntarily taken 
up:
‘I do not suggest that anyone who sincerely repents his wrongdoing must express this 
through a penance […] My claim is only that he may intelligibly feel the need for a 
penance’ (1986, p.69)
It may be misleading to claim that the suffering of repentance is entirely self-imposed. As a step 
towards  reparation,  some (perhaps  tacit)  negotiation  about  what  sort  of  burdens  or  how much 
suffering  could  repair  the  relationship,  is  likely  appropriate.  In  such  cases,  the  suffering  of 
repentance will  be conditional:  if  relations  are  to  be restored,  then some burdensome suffering 
ought to be undertaken. Precisely how much will depend on the nature of the wrong, and on the 
nature of the relationship damaged. 
These  features  of  repentance  are  important.  Following  wrong-doing,  one  might  desire  that  the 
wrong-doer suffers the burdens of repentance.  But it  would be wrong to aim to impose it:  for 
repentance is voluntarily undertaken and conditional upon the wish to repair relationships. It may be 
that  the  relationship  cannot  be  restored,  or  that  it  is  not  something  the  relevant  parties  want. 
Consider Bennett's example: Bryson has cheated on his partner, has accepted blame and feels guilt. 
Should his partner then seek that Bryson suffers for the sake of repairing the relationship, taking on 
burdens in order to make up for the wrong? If the relationship is to go on, then it is likely that such 
steps will be required. But perhaps whilst Bryson is sorry and feels bad about the harm he caused, 
he does not want to repair the relationship. Or, he may wish to do so, but finds the penitential 
burdens needed to show  his repentance too great: he may not want a relationship in which he is 
always making amends. He may accept the blame, but decide not undertake a penance, and to leave 
the relationship.
This example brings out another important feature of this aspect of retributive responses: in the case 
where it is decided that relationships will not be restored, it would be wholly inappropriate for the 
wronged party to insist on repentance. It would be wrong, for example, to detain or coerce Bryson 
into  undertaking  burdens;  or  to  persist  in  demanding that  reparative  steps  are  taken.  Whilst  in 
interpersonal relationships repentance and its ‘penitential suffering’ can play an important role in 
restoring  relationships  that  have  been  damaged  by the  wrong,  such  suffering  is  (perhaps  with 
negotiation) self-imposed, and conditional upon the desire to restore the fractured relationship.
4.1. Justifying punishment?
I argued that the suffering of guilt cannot provide support for retributive state punishment. Can 
repentance? A number of theorists have suggested that we can see the suffering of repentance as an 
analogue for the suffering imposed by punishment. Duff argues that punishment is appropriately 
thought of as a secular penance. He talks of:
‘the part which hard treatment can properly play …(it serves as a penance which the 
criminal should ideally come to will for himself)’ (1986, p.245);
‘we should understand and justify criminal punishment … as a species of secular penance’ 
(2001, p.106).23
Again I want to briefly suggest that the interpersonal case is not a good analogue to state practices 
of  punishment  and  cannot  provide  support  for  them.  First,  the  kind  of  suffering  involved  in 
reparation is self-imposed and voluntarily undertaken. As such, it differs significantly from the kind 
of suffering involved in punishment, where it is imposed by some third party. 
Duff suggests that the imposition of suffering might be needed to focus the wrong-doers attention 
on the wrong:
‘it provides a structure within which, we hope, he will be able to think about the nature 
and implications of his crime, face up to it more adequately than he might otherwise 
(being human) do, and so arrive at a more authentic repentance’ (2001, p.108)
But  in  earlier  discussion  I  mentioned  empirical  considerations  which   indicate  that  imposing 
23 Bennett 2008 has also attempted to connect the interpersonal ‘cycle of blame and apology’ to state practices of 
punishment.  His  account  differs  in  structure  from Duff’s  (on which the  hard treatment  (amongst  other  things) 
represents the penitential suffering of the wrong-doer. For Bennett, hard treatment expresses how wrong we think an 
act is, symbolising how sorry that person ought to be – that is, how much they would have to do to make up for the 
wrong  (2008,  pp.146).  I  cannot  do  justice  to  these  claims  here,  but  will  for  now  note  that  it  is  not  usually 
appropriate, in interpersonal relationships, to impose suffering in accordance with how sorry we think another ought 
to be. Earlier concerns also arise, about whether non-painful modes of expression can have appropriate symbolic 
force. Detailed consideration of Bennett’s claims in this regard is reserved for another occasion.
suffering is not likely to encourage reflection on past wrong-doing, so we have reason think Duff's 
claim here are unduly optimistic. In any case, Duff’s remarks here suppose that the wrong-doer has 
already ‘signed up’ to repentance: suffering helps him to repent ‘authentically’. However, if the 
individual has not 'signed up' to repentance (he need not, we saw from considering interpersonal 
relations), this justification cannot apply. If Duff supposes that harsh treatment is likely to persuade 
the offender to ‘sign up’, then we return to the thought, supported by empirical evidence, that harsh 
treatment seems not to be a good strategy for achieving this.
Secondly, penitential suffering is appropriately taken up in negotiation with the wronged, regarding 
what burdens are required. But in state punishment there is little room for negotiation.24 Further, in 
interpersonal  relationships this  negotiation leaves it  open for the wrong-doer  to  decide to walk 
away. The relationship need not be restored: the parties can exit the damaged relationship. Finally, it 
would be deeply problematic in such interpersonal contexts for the wronged party to insist that 
reparative burdens are undertaken, or to coerce the wrong-doer into them.
In contrast,  state punishment is not voluntarily undertaken. There is no ‘walking away’ when it 
comes  to  the  practice  of  state  punishment,  as  there  is  in  interpersonal  relationships:  punitive 
suffering is imposed coercively. Indeed, the coercive element sometimes constitutes the suffering or 
burdensome  element  of  punishment:  activities  that  are  not  intrinsically  painful  (such  as  those 
involved in community service) are punitive because they are coercively imposed (see Duff, 2001, 
pp.99-104).
This coercive element to penitential suffering finds no support in our interpersonal practices, as 
Morris observes:
'the role of punishment is nonexistent, insignificant, or positively perverse in contexts 
where moral wrong is done a stranger or where a friendship or love relationship based 
on affection, respect, and trust has been damaged. [...] Infliction of punishment by the 
injured party upon the other party has a peculiar inappropriateness' (1971, p.430)
The  role  of  repentance  in  interpersonal  practice  cannot  support  such  coercive  practices  of 
punishment  by  the  state.  Our  interpersonal  practices  involve  individuals  undertaking  the  self-
imposed  suffering  of  reparation,  where  this  is  not  the  only  option.  Punishment  involves  the 
imposition by a third party of suffering, where there is no other option.
Perhaps  in  political  community,  assumptions  concerning  the  acceptance  of  appropriate  burdens 
follow from a commitment to shared values.25 As in religious communities, Duff argues, punitive 
suffering can be justified if  members  are  committed to  the values  flouted,  and if  the suffering 
imposed is ‘(if not at first, then in the end) mediated by her own understanding and acceptance of its 
necessity’ (Duff 1986, p.251).  However, Duff’s analogy with religious penance differs from state 
punishment in a number of ways. 
First, membership of a state is non-voluntary and there are no exit options (especially not when one 
has  committed  a  law-breaking  wrong).26 Membership  of  religious  groups  is  not  always,  but 
sometimes,  voluntary,  so it  may be clearer  that  one subscribes  to  the penitential  rituals  of  that 
community.  (Even  this  much  is  not  clear:  you  may be  a  firm believer  in  the  religion,  whilst 
fervently  seeking  to  reform what  you  regard  as  unduly coercive  punitive  measures.)  Secondly, 
unlike being a member of a state, one also has the option of leaving a religious community: as in 
24 Although, Duff notes that his communicative account favours  negotiated sentencing (2001, pp.158-163).
25 Compare Murphy's claim that punitive legitimacy is secured only if citizens (could) rationally will the laws by 
which they are governed (1973).
26 Whilst membership of a particular state may sometimes be voluntary, membership of any state at all is not usually 
avoidable (and rarely beneficial).
personal  relations,  one  can  (perhaps  at  some  cost)  decide  to  leave  rather  than  to  take  on  the 
penitential burdens. Not so for state punishment.27
Let's consider a final attempt to justify the coercive imposition of suffering. Whilst the suffering of 
state punishment could be embraced as a way of showing repentance, even if the wrong-doer does 
not sincerely repent or wish to offer a sincere apology, ‘going through the motions’ can nonetheless 
play an important role in allowing her to show that she is willing to do what is expected of her (Duff 
2001, p.95, 109). Imposing punishment enables individuals to ‘go through the motions’ – to do what 
would be required for the repairing of relationships, if wrong-doer and wronged were to want this.
Whether or not Duff is right about the importance of ritual or formalized apologies, his proposals 
find  no  support  in  the  processes  of  repentance  in  interpersonal  relationships  where,  as  I  have 
emphasised, coercively imposed suffering is not permissible. To coercively impose suffering upon 
one's cheating partner, in order that they ‘go through the motions’ of undertaking penance would 
indeed have a 'peculiar inappropriateness'.28 The ritualised aspect of apology still depends upon the 
willingness of the wrong-doer to undertake what is  expected,  if  not to sincerely repent,  and so 
cannot provide a link from the penitential suffering undertaken in interpersonal relationships to the 
suffering imposed by punishment.
5. Concluding remarks
The desire for suffering is a problematic component of the retributive emotions, but I have argued in 
support of the view that in interpersonal relationships it can be morally permissible to desire, and to 
aim at, the suffering of guilt. The retributive emotions, then, can be constituted by a desire for the 
suffering of the wrong-doer without being barbaric or base or vindictive. But this conclusion cannot 
provide support for retributive state punishment. State punishment imposes painful treatment and is 
coercive. The suffering of interpersonal relationships is of a qualitatively different sort (the pain of 
guilt), is induced rather than imposed, and, with respect to repentance, need not be undertaken (as 
one has the option of deciding not to repair the relationship). The retributivism of interpersonal 
relationships cannot provide justificatory support for retributive state punishment.29
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